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Critiquing Debate 
James P. Dimock 
 
Debaters enjoy debating more than debate itself. The closer one gets to be-
coming ―an old debater‖ (a category to which I will inevitably have to resign 
myself sooner or later), the more likely we are to find ourselves debating on the 
side of ―the way debate used to be‖ or ―the way debate is supposed to be.‖ I 
don‘t malign this seemly inevitable progression or even my place in it. I think 
the tendency to re-examine ourselves says something about our activity. 
I enter this debate about debate, I think I should begin by defining my side 
of the flow, or to at least identify which side of the flow I am attacking. My pur-
pose is not to condemn debating or to defend the good old days of debate. Ra-
ther I hope to engage in a critique of the activity. Debaters are familiar with cri-
tique, often spelled with a ―k,‖ as an attack upon the philosophical or ideological 
assumptions of the opponent‘s argument but critiques exist outside the world of 
debate as well and their purpose is not merely to win arguments. Critique, as 
Ingram and Simon-Ingram (1992) noted, aims ―at emancipating … addresses 
from ideology‖ (p. xxviii) and McKerrow (1989) argued the practice of critical 
rhetoric is ―to unmask or demystify the discourse of power‖ and ―to understand 
the integration of power/knowledge in society‖ (p. 91). My critique is concerned 
not with what is good or bad debating, but with how debate constructs ―a partic-
ular vision of the world‖ and the ―forms of power … embraced or implicated‖ 
(McKerrow, 2001, p. 621) by the activity. Specifically, the focus of my effort is 
on the practice of competitive debating, in particular how debate practices con-
trol and organize knowledge in fundamentally undemocratic ways.  
That debate should lend itself to undemocratic ideology is ironic. The activ-
ity of debate has long been justified and defended on the grounds of its demo-
cratic-ness. Advocates of debate, at both the high school and collegiate level, 
have grounded their support for the activity on its capacity to train students in 
the skills necessary for citizenship in a democratic society. Freely (1996) con-
tended that, ―Society benefits if debate is encouraged, both because free and 
open debate protects the rights of individuals and because debate offers society a 
way of reaching optimal decisions‖ (p. 6). The connection between participation 
in debate and democracy is a core assumption of debate coaches and forensic 
educators. In Mitchell‘s (1998) words, the connection between democracy and 
debate is a ―faith inscribed in the American Forensic Association‘s Credo, re-
produced in scores of argumentation textbooks, and rehearsed over and over 
again in introductory argumentation courses‖ (para. 2). The advocates of debate 
support the link between debate and participation in a democratic society. Muir 
(1993), for example, has claimed: 
 
… debate involves certain skills, including research and policy evaluation, 
that evolve along with the debater‘s consciousness of the complexities of 
moral and political dilemmas. This conceptual development is a basis for 
the formation of ideas and relational thinking necessary for effective public 
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decision making, making even the game of debate a significant benefit in 
solving real world problems. (p. 287) 
 
The advocates of contest debating assume almost categorically that debating 
teaches students to question assumptions, think critically and research posi-
tions—all keys to arguing effectively. If we take as a given the premise that a 
democratic society depends upon argument and, second, that debate provides 
students with instruction in the art of argumentation, then it is reasonable to con-
clude debate should be valued by and fostered in a democratic society. Such 
reasoning holds, however, only insofar as we can reasonably assume all argu-
ment is equally democratic. If the assumption doesn‘t hold, however, then un-
democratic argumentation must be distinguished from the democratic. Thus, the 
purpose of my critique. 
I believe two aspects of contest debating run counter to the democratic 
goals of the activity: concision and the unqualified obedience to authority; each 
aspect addressed in turn. 
 
Concision 
One of the most anti-critical dimensions of debating is the structural imposi-
tion of concision upon argumentation. I borrow the concept from Noam 
Chomsky who identified concision as a property of the propaganda model of the 
media. The model posits that the mass-media filters news and information in 
order to marginalize dissent and protect moneyed and powerful interests. In the 
context of mass-media, ―concision means you have to be able to say things be-
tween two commercials‖ (Chomsky, 2002, p. 387). Concision as a structural 
constraint ―imposes conformism in a very deep way because if you have to meet 
the condition of concision, you can only either repeat conventional platitudes or 
else you sound like you are from Neptune‖ (p. 387). If a person says, for exam-
ple, that Iran sponsors terrorism, the claim sounds perfectly reasonable and the 
speaker is simply repeating a position said over and over again. Thus, little if 
any evidence is required to back up the claim. The claim can be made concisely. 
Suppose, however, the speaker was to make an unconventional claim by stating 
the United States sponsors terrorism. Under such conditions, Chomsky con-
tended, people have a right to demand evidence in support of that claim. 
Chomsky explained the dilemma: 
 
This structural requirement of concision that‘s imposed by our media disal-
lows the possibility of explanation; in fact, that‘s its propaganda function. It 
means that you can repeat conventional platitudes, but you can‘t say any-
thing out of the ordinary without sounding as if you‘re from Neptune, a 
wacko, because to explain what you meant—and people have a right to ask 
if it‘s an unconventional thought—would take a bit of time. (p. 387) 
 
One only need watch television news pundits like Bill O‘Reilly to see the 
concision principle in action: the more the guests‘ opinions differ from the host, 
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the less they are allowed to speak. Even those who do get to talk at length are 
getting only a minute or two to explain themselves. Only those who are able to 
express simple ideas that require little or no supporting analysis or evidence are 
able to get their point across clearly. The further outside the mainstream an idea 
is, the more likely the guest will sound like someone ―from Neptune.‖ Intention-
al or not, Chomsky concluded, concision is ―highly functional to impose thought 
control‖ (p. 387). It makes it very difficult to challenge established political 
dogmas and makes it easy to ridicule those who do. 
Experts on debating and argumentation have derided the impact of conci-
sion on other forms of debating. The first broadcast political debate in the Unit-
ed States, a presidential primary debate between Thomas Dewey and Harold 
Stassen, lasted for an hour with each candidate being given twenty minutes for 
his opening statement and eight and a half minute for rebuttals. The debate was 
on a single topic: whether or not the communist Party should be outlawed. In his 
analysis of the debate, Kane (1987) suggested the debate had a meaningful im-
pact on the Oregon State Primary after which Dewey‘s failing campaign was 
―resurrected‖ and Stassen‘s ―was all but finished‖ (p. 252). Since then, however, 
the political campaign debates have gotten considerably shorter. Kennedy and 
Nixon had only eight-minute opening statements followed by two-and-a-half 
minute responses to questions. In the 2004 Presidential debates between George 
Bush and John Kerry, the time allotted per question was only two minutes. 
While the length of time for the debates permits the covering of many subjects, 
nothing can be covered in any depth. The format for debates in presidential 
campaigns has been tinkered with many times over the years but, as Kane ob-
served, ―No degree of tampering … will compensate for the basic inadequacy 
that one cannot develop a meaningful position in a very few minutes‖ (p. 250). 
Debates may influence voters, yet scholars of argumentation and debating have 
been negative in their assessment of the quality of these ―debates.‖ The debates 
are certainly not critical in the sense I am using the term here nor could they be 
so constrained by concision. 
This principle of concision is also at work in contest debating. Time con-
straints ensure argumentation is limited and that conventional points of view 
will dominate the debate. Positions firmly within the mainstream require only 
the sparsest analysis and scantest evidence. The quality or depth of support is 
hardly at issue since the position is presumed already. Opposition, on the other 
hand, requires considerable support and is subjected to intense scrutiny. A deba-
ter need only suggest Iran has no right to arm itself with nuclear weapons, but 
considerable resources would be required to support the contention that the Un-
ites States has no right to their weapons. 
Concision is not simply a byproduct of the time constraints imposed on 
speakers; after all, we must be some reasonable time limits both to ensure that 
the debate is fair (both sides get equal amounts of time) and that the debate tour-
nament is manageable (you can‘t schedule multiple rounds of competition unless 
you have some sense of how long each round will be). Placing limits on time is 
perfectly reasonable. We should observe, however, how short time limits are 
given the complexity of the issues considered. Even a simple question of policy 
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must consider reasons for changing policy (harms and inherency), the nature of 
the change to be made (plan) and the grounds for expecting positive change in 
conditions (solvency). The complexity of topics debated has increase dramati-
cally since formal intercollegiate debating began, yet time limits have changed 
little. The topic of the first National Debate Tournament in 1947 was ―Resolved: 
That labor should be given a direct share in the management of industry‖ (Na-
tional Debate Tournament, n.d. ―Anticipating,‖ para. 10). In 2008 - 2009, deba-
ters will consider: 
 
Resolved: that the United States Federal Government should substantially 
reduce its agricultural support, at least eliminating nearly all of the domestic 
subsidies, for biofuels, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, corn, cot-
ton, dairy, fisheries, rice, soybeans, sugar and/or wheat. (NDT, n.d. ―Top-
ics,‖ para. 1) 
 
 As the complexity of the topic increases, the inherent complexity of policy 
questions increases exponentially. Yet the time permitted to address complexity 
has not. 
As complexity of topics increases, so too does the need for concision. More 
issues means the time dedicated to each issue is less. Good debaters are at least 
tacitly aware of this condition and use it to their competitive advantage, wherev-
er possible taking the stance most likely to have little need of rigorous advocacy. 
Such positions are likely to favor the existing structure and current political 
dogmas. Change can be advocated, but the basic structure and assumptions of 
the status quo are not challenged. To extend a metaphor used by radicals (see, 
for example Friedberg, 2007), it‘s permissible to rearrange who gets how much 
of the pie, as long as the baker remains the same. 
The pedagogical foundations of debating, assume that students engage in 
the activity in order to develop skills conducive to their participation in a demo-
cratic society as informed and engaged citizens. Debating should habituate stu-
dents to questioning assumptions and demanding that claims be justified on the 
basis of accurate information and sound reasoning. Debaters conditioned upon 
concision as both a structural constraint and a strategic necessity, however, in-
culcate blind spots and constrain thought. Debaters trained to argue within the 
status quo but not to challenge its basic assumptions might well be more dan-
gerous to the cause of genuine democracy than had they had no such training at 
all. Those who have had no training are, at least, not brainwashed into believing 
they have reached the limits of what can be argued. 
 
Obedience to Authority 
Since Aristotle, scholars of argumentation have identified different types of 
arguments debaters might use in defense or refutation of a given claim. How 
those types of argument are delineated depends upon the person making the 
classifications. We generally recognize arguments can be divided into two dis-
tinctly different classes. Aristotle (1946) distinguished between artistic proofs 
(ethos, pathos and logos) and inartistic proofs (―witnesses, evidence given under 
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torture, written contracts, and so on‖) (p. 1355b). Rhetorician Richard M. Weav-
er (1974) classified arguments as ―‗internal‘ in the sense that they involve our 
own interpretation of experience‖ and ―‗external‘ sources‖ of argument ―which 
utilize the interpretation of others‖ (p. 144). External arguments, in the simplest 
form, involve citation of authorities or the quoting of witness testimony. I, for 
example, could have made the distinction between internal and external argu-
ments based upon my own understanding of the structure of arguments. Instead, 
however, I invoked Weaver and Aristotle as authorities in order to make my 
argument. The basic structure of the argument from authority can be seen in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 
 
The syllogism makes apparent such arguments ―have no intrinsic force; 
whatever persuasive power they carry is derived from the credit of the testifier 
5
Dimock: Critiquing Debate
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2016
 86 Speaker & Gavel 2009 
  
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
 
or the weight of the authority‖ (Weaver, 1974, p. 146). The lack of intrinsic 
force does not mean, however, that arguments from authority and testimony are 
not legitimate forms of argument. Rather, it means such arguments depend upon 
the credibility of the witness or expert which lie outside the argument, thus they 
are called external arguments. 
Even the best arguers will often base claims upon authority and it is certain-
ly true that critical thinkers, speakers, and writers cite sources of their informa-
tion (Dimock, Treinen, Cronn-Mills & Jersak, 2008). It is important, however, 
to avoid obfuscating the distinction between citing sources and the argument 
from authority as a distinct mode of argument.  
 
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
The arguments in Figures 1 and 2 are both based on Toulmin‘s (1964) mod-
el of argument but I have modified them slightly to highlight the distinction be-
tween citing sources and arguing from authority. In Figure 1, the argument is 
supported by authority in order to establish key facts or concepts but the argu-
ment itself stands on the strength of the arguer‘s inference, the conclusion drawn 
from those facts and concepts. The argument from authority, as seen in Figure 2, 
is distinctly different. Therein, the conclusion is sustained entirely by authority. 
The data (where Steven was born) and the warrant (who is a British subject un-
der British law) are presumably there but they are in the mind of the expert. As 
auditors we are not privy to the data used, the concepts that provide the warrant; 
only the conclusion and the assurance (which is often enthymematic) that we 
should take his or her word for it.  
I think it is important to stress nothing inherently wrong with the argument 
from authority. Authority is especially valuable to arguers who are unable to 
ground arguments in their own experience (just because I have never been to 
Iraq doesn‘t mean I should be disqualified from arguing about the Iraq War), 
provide arguers with perfectly reasonable shortcuts (it is easier and more rea-
sonable to defer to experts on legal questions than research all of the statutes and 
relevant case law on my own). Indeed, in some cases the conclusions of res-
pected authorities and experts should trump those of the inexpert. If I choke on 
biscotti at my favorite coffee shop, the only opinions I am interested in are those 
of persons who are trained in the Heimlich maneuver. No one else‘s opinion 
matters. 
In such cases, the argument from authority can be qualified. If we draw 
upon the testimony of those who have been to Iraq when we have not been there 
for ourselves, we would look at the quality of that testimony: How many wit-
nesses do we ground our argument upon? What is the range of the witnesses‘ 
experience? Are the witnesses reliable and credible? When we allow experts to 
synthesize information and ideas for us, as in the case of legal scholarship we 
ask different questions: Is the expert qualified? Is the opinion rendered within 
the expert‘s field of experience and training? Does he or she have the support of 
other experts within the field? Does he or she have any agenda which might call 
into question his or her conclusions? Finally, with respect to technical processes 
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or procedures, we can qualify the technician: Where and how was the technician 
trained? How much experience does he or she have? 
Arguments from authority are an important component in the arguer‘s tool-
box. It is important that we, as scholars of argumentation, understand the prin-
ciples and limits of authority as a mode of argument. Unfortunately, however, 
scholars of argument have tended to pay little attention to the argument from 
authority. Neglect of the argument from authority begins with Aristotle (1946) 
who chose to ignore the ‗inartistic proofs‘ and concentrate upon those proofs 
―such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric‖ (p. 
1355b). In the Enlightenment, the argument from authority was considered a 
fallacious ―reluctance to challenge authorities that are learned, eminent or po-
werful‖ (Hamblin, 1970, p. 162). The philosopher John Locke called arguments 
from authority ―argumentum ad verecundiam,‖ and dismissed as fallacious the 
invocation not only of ―worthless authorities‖ but also those ―worthy authorities, 
whom it is normally reasonable to trust, maybe wrong‖ (Hamblin, 1970, p. 162). 
Contemporary scholars have continued to marginalize the argument from au-
thority. For example, in what might be the most extensive treatment of argumen-
tation and argumentation theory in recent years, van Eemeren and his colleagues 
(1996) invest almost nothing in the subject of the argumentation from authority 
continuing to favor other modes of inference and reasoning. But if scholars have 
been dismissive of the argument from authority, debaters have embraced it 
whole heartedly.  
Freeley‘s Argumentation and Debate has been a standard in the discipline 
for more than 40 years and the textbook is noted for being principally a work on 
debate rather than argumentation theory (Hostettler, 1961; Bjork, 1994). Thus 
Argumentation and Debate is a good indicator of what is valued by instruc-
tors of debate as opposed to those who emphasize argumentation. Now in its 
11th edition, Freeley and Steinberg (2005) have dedicated chapters to the struc-
ture of arguments (Chapter 8), the types of arguments (Chapter 9), and fallacies 
(Chapter 10). Balancing this treatment of argumentation, three chapters are ded-
icated to evidence wherein Freeley and Steinberg‘s treat such topics as the loca-
tion of sources, reading critically, types of evidence, tests of evidence, and other 
dimensions of the argument from authority. As much weight is placed upon the 
argument from authority as is given to all other modes and types of arguments 
combined. Clearly, Freeley and Steinberg give considerably more attention to 
the argument from authority than van Eemeren et al. give the topic. 
I do not wish to suggest that I have conducted a systematic investigation of 
argumentation or debate textbooks. I believe, however, the difference between 
Freeley and Steinberg‘s attention to testimonial and authoritative evidence and 
that given by van Eemeren et al. is indicative of the different treatment given the 
subject of authority is given in the two arenas. In argumentation studies, the sub-
ject is given little attention and clearly marginalized as a form of argument while 
in debate it is prioritized. Argumentation scholars may unfairly exclude the ar-
gument from authority but within the sphere of interscholastic and intercolle-
8
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giate debate, the argument from authority is not merely a mode of argument; it is 
the primary mode of argument.  
All arguers probably make use of the argument from authority to some ex-
tent or another and using such arguments is perfectly reasonable. My concern 
here and what I believe should concern all of us who think debate should be 
grounded in a democratic pedagogy is the overreliance on the argument from 
authority to the exclusion of other modes of argument.  
Arguments from authority have a presumptive status in competitive debate. 
If a debater must choose between the use of authority and any other mode of 
argument, debaters will pick the argument from authority opting other forms of 
argument only when the option to cite evidence is not available. The opponent‘s 
rebuttal will predictably be that, although the argument might be cogent, there 
was ―no evidence.‖ When evidence clashes with any other form of argument, 
evidence wins and debaters know it. As coaches and judges we reinforce it. 
I think the reliance upon a single mode of argument is unquestionably un-
critical, like a carpenter who might have had some theoretical training in the use 
of tools but who really only uses a hammer. Certainly, the hammer is a useful 
tool and necessary for some tasks but I would have a hard time calling anyone a 
master carpenter who did not also have a working knowledge of the saw, the 
screwdriver, and a host of other essential tools. In the same way, we cannot just-
ly claim to be teaching argumentation when in truth we are only teaching one 
type of argument, even if we are teaching it very well. 
This prioritization of one mode of argument at the expense of all others is 
more than just educationally unsound, it is also uncritical. Rhetorician Richard 
Weaver (1953) said that how a person argues ―tells us how he is thinking about 
the world‖ (p. 55) and is thus ―a truer index of his beliefs than his explicit pro-
fession of principles‖ (p. 58). Weaver concluded that those who prefer the ar-
gument from definition, as he did, tended toward conservatism while those who 
argued from circumstance were liberal. Extending that position, I contend that 
those who favor the argument from authority are not necessarily conservative or 
liberal but technocratic. 
Democracy assumes people are able to understand social, political, and eco-
nomic questions, to weigh evidence, and make reasoned decisions. Conversely, 
technocracy (as I am using the term herein) assumes that people are generally 
incapable of understanding, analysis, and reasoned decision-making on such 
issues.  
Noam Chomsky (2006) offered an example of the distinction between dem-
ocratic and technocratic thinking. Chomsky noted that although he is perhaps 
most well-known for his political and social commentary, he is education and 
expertise is in the field of linguistics. His critics have often used this fact against 
him, suggesting that he is unqualified to render commentary on matters of public 
policy and international relations. Chomsky‘s response is that such criticism is 
not only irrelevant but indicative of an undemocratic mindset. ―The alleged 
complexity, depth and obscurity‖ of political and social questions are: 
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…part of the illusion propagated by the system of ideological control 
which aims to make these issues seem remote from the general popula-
tion and to persuade them of their incapacity to organized their own af-
fairs or to understand the social world in which they live without the tu-
telage of intermediaries. (p. 70) 
 
The insistence upon authority to validate claims raised in the political sphere 
precludes ordinary citizens from voicing their beliefs on political questions re-
moving them from the political process. It effectively domesticates the demos 
and excludes them from the political sphere. The citizen is positioned outside 
the political discourse, assigned the role of passive observer while participation 
is left to experts. 
Debaters are not to analyze issues for themselves or exercise what Chomsky 
called their own ―Cartesian common sense‖ which he believed required little 
more than ―willingness to look at the facts with an open mind, to put simple 
assumptions to the test, and to pursue an argument to its conclusion‖ (Chomsky, 
2006, p. 70). Instead, debaters are required to cite experts, to make not their own 
judgments but to discover those of qualified others and recite them at the pre-
scribed moment.  
Ultimately, privileging authority is incompatible with the critical perspec-
tive. The obedience to authority, the assumptions that for every question there is 
an expert who can provide the answer, and ordinary people are not competent to 
discuss policy options without appeal to those who have the ‗right‘ kind of 
knowledge: these are the core premises of technocratic thinking. I would con-
tend, no great step is required to move from the position that experts alone have 
the right to draw conclusions about policy questions to the position that experts 
should be the ones making policy decisions. There is simply nothing democratic 
about that. 
 
Conclusion 
The problems posed by concision and the overemphasis of the argumenta-
tion from authority are interrelated concerns. The problem of concision is ex-
acerbated by overly-broad topics. So is the problem of overreliance on authority. 
As Ziegemuller (1996) noted ―although there was, over the years, some gradual 
increase in the amount of evidence used by debaters at the NDT, the rapid ex-
pansion in the quantity of evidence used largely coincided with the adoption of 
… broad topics‖ (para. 8). As topics become unmanageably broad, it makes it 
difficult for debaters to develop their own sense of the ideas or to explore them 
in depth. Unable to make personal judgments upon the issues, debaters are 
forced to rely upon the judgments of others. 
Debaters who use the argument from authority are also able to argue more 
concisely than those who develop other modes of analysis. One need only return 
to Figure 2 and Figure 3 to see which is more concise. Furthermore, the argu-
ment from authority aggravates the uncritical nature of concision. Concision 
favors dominant opinions and current political dogma which are repeated over 
10
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and over again in the media. It is thus far easier to find evidence to support 
mainstream viewpoints and perspectives. Constrained by concision, authorities 
whose conclusions are too far outside the mainstream must be quoted at greater 
length in order to make their claims appear rational. Debaters who keep their 
positions within the very narrow range of the dominant paradigm have a consi-
derable tactical advantage over those who attempt to argue from outside that 
paradigm. 
Concision and the overreliance on authority are practices which make it 
very difficult to challenge the dominant paradigm. Because they reinforce the 
dominant ideology, which has tended to favor some groups (white, male, 
straight, Christian, Western, elites, etc.) while marginalizing others (people of 
color, women, GLBT, non-Christian, non-Western, poor, etc.). For a long time, 
we have justified our activity on the grounds that it prepares young people for 
leadership. But what kinds of leaders will they be? Whether they move on to 
take roles in government, industry and finance or even the academy, will they be 
the kind of leaders who are instilled with a respect for democracy? Debate, as it 
is currently practiced, is designed to produce technocratic elites not democratic 
citizens. 
In our civic culture, individuals are feeling more and more distant from the 
processes of democracy. Zinn (1997) has noted, for example, that ―surveys since 
the early seventies show that 70 to 80 percent of Americans are distrustful of 
government, business an the military‖ (p. 474). An even stronger indicator of 
people‘s alienation from the political process is the low voter turnout, especially 
among the most disenfranchised segments of the population. The Census Bureau 
reported that in 2004 voter turnout was up but still only 64 percent and rates 
were lower among those who are the most marginalized in the status quo: racial 
minorities, the poor and the youth (Faler, 2005). Voter turnout rates are dismal 
but the rates of actual participation in politics have been pathetic. While there 
was an upsurge of participation in 2008, whether this is the beginning of trend or 
an anomaly remains to be seen. We can conclude, however, that a democratic 
society is not possible without citizens who see themselves as empowered 
agents of action capable of understanding issues and making reasoned decisions. 
We cannot train leaders to do not believe that ordinary people are capable of 
understanding issues and making reasoned decisions and expect democracy to 
flourish or even survive.  
I debated throughout high school and college. I don‘t write this critique be-
cause I hate debate or resent debaters. I genuinely believe that no activity has 
done more for me intellectually than debate. I am convinced that it is an empo-
wering activity and I believe thousands of others like me are proof of that.But as 
a critical scholar, I cannot come to the conclusion that debate is personally em-
powering and stop there. I cannot accept the conclusion that debating develops 
critical thinkers but not critically-minded citizens and believe we are doing good 
enough. I don‘t believe debate has failed. I believe debate has failed to take the 
next step. 
We can improve the critical capacity of debating and transform the activity 
into a truly critical education: 
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1. We need to fight concision and allow for arguments and positions to be fully 
considered. This means we need to extend time limits and to ask narrower 
questions. We simply cannot expect anyone to explain what is wrong with 
the Horn of Africa and how to fix it in less than ten minutes. 
2. We need to value alternative modes of argument and not just as off-beat kri-
tiks offered as merely another way to try and win the ballot. Thus, we need to 
stop being just judges of debate and start becoming scholars and students of 
argumentation. Arbitrary changes to the rules have been tried and have failed 
because we have continued to think of ourselves as debaters rather than as 
arguers and judges of debates rather than as teachers of argument.  
3. We need to start taking our mission seriously. Debate is a game but like any 
good game its purpose is to instruct and to instill values. If we truly believe 
we are preparing students for leadership in a democracy and that our activity 
exists in order to strengthen the foundation of a free society, we should start 
acting like those values matter. 
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